Description
Latin America was the first region to establish a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) through the Treaty of Tlatelolco signed in 1967. This regime prohibited the presence of nuclear weapons throughout the delimited perimeter, including the production, transfer, transport, transit, storage, testing, and reception of nuclear devices, as well as the installation of platforms and launch systems for this arsenal. In this way, the Latin American continent contributed to the International System with a peaceful and strategic formula that would be reproduced both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period in other regions of the world, establishing other new NWFZs. From this perspective, we highlight the existence of certain weaknesses that affect the effectiveness of the Tlatelolco regime in the 21st century. We have identified at least four issues that challenge the regional regime. First, the gradual increase in nuclear waste and the disposal of such waste by countries possessing nuclear reactors. Secondly, we have the new de facto nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea), countries that must assume the commitments of the Additional Protocols. Thirdly, there is still no clear reform of Articles 18 and 10 of the Treaty, which allow for "peaceful nuclear explosions." Finally, there is a need to request a review of the Interpretative Declarations made by the de jure nuclear powers regarding their commitments to respect the status of Latin American denuclearization. Therefore, this research analyzes the paradox that Tlatelolco currently faces, being the first established ZLAN (Zone of Nuclear and Nuclear Action), with relative success, but with enormous vulnerabilities that undermine the effectiveness of the regime, precisely in the context of the third decade of the 21st century, in which we observe an ongoing crisis.