Description
This paper examines North Korea’s initial engagement with the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, highlighted by its accession to the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1974 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985. Utilizing declassified diplomatic records from South Korea, the United States, and the IAEA archives, along with publicly available North Korean statements, this paper aimes to contextualize North Korea’s membership in the IAEA and the NPT within the shifting dynamics of Cold War geopolitics, inter-Korean relations, and the global nuclear framework. The study argues that North Korea’s decision to join the IAEA and the NPT was not solely based on a commitment to nonproliferation principles. Instead, it was primarily a strategic move aimed at gaining international legitimacy, acquiring civilian nuclear technology, and managing its relationship with the Soviet Union and other countries. However, Pyongyang’s reluctance to accept full safeguards and its contentious interactions with the IAEA revealed persistent mistrust of international oversight over time. This initial engagement did not prevent Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, which became evident with it withdrew from the IAEA in 1994 and from the NPT in 2003. This historical reassessment clarifies North Korea’s dual role as both a participant in and a potential challenger to the global nuclear regime. It also provides insights into the structural and political constraints that influenced the country’s subsequent nuclear trajectory.
