Description
This study investigates how and why the Fergana Valley became a durable “threat space” after 2001, even as radical Islamist groups were relocating beyond Central Asia and their influence in the region was receding. The research puzzle arises from the paradox that the Valley was not targeted during periods of greater Islamist activity in the 1990s, but became the focal point of spatialized and militarized practices only in the aftermath of 9/11. The literature at the intersection of IR and geopolitics provides useful discussions on territoriality and identity, yet it largely neglects the question of how security practices become spatialized, evolve over time, and interact with international dynamics. Conventional Area Studies accounts portray the Valley as inherently strategic or prone to instability, while critical work in the region focuses on securitization or human security. Neither strand sufficiently explains the historically specific transformation of the Valley into a securitized space nor its relationship to global counterterrorism practices. Methodologically, the paper employs discourse analysis of state speeches, policy documents, and international security initiatives, tracing the evolution of radical Islamism and corresponding security measures. It demonstrates that the militarization of the Valley after 2001—manifested in border mines, “courage schools,” intensified surveillance, and the policing of religious practices—was enabled by the Global War on Terror. Through partnerships with the United States, Russia, and China, Central Asian regimes translated external resources and concerns into domestic authoritarian strategies. The findings show that the Valley’s securitization was not the inevitable product of geography or threat, but the result of relational processes in which marginal actors reproduced the international order at the local level. This case highlights how domestic and international practices are mutually constitutive, offering important insights for Global IR and the relational turn by demonstrating how the “international” and the “local” co-produced security practices.
