Description
Why do technologically advanced states diverge in their ability to militarize emerging commercial technologies? From submarines in the late nineteenth century to nuclear weapons in the twentieth and drones in the twenty-first, the pace and direction of military innovation have depended less on technological discovery itself than on how states mobilize and institutionalize civilian expertise. This study examines the early phase of commercial drone militarization across the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Korea, focusing on three explanatory factors: the defense industrial base, organizational flexibility, and key actors. It argues that the United States leads due to its expanded and hybridized defense industrial base, which integrates private technology firms and non-military engineers as central agents of innovation. The United Kingdom, by contrast, remains constrained by bureaucratic inertia within a technocratic defense establishment, slowing the application of AI-enabled drone technologies. South Korea's experience further highlights how stringent defense standards, rooted in persistent security threats from North Korea, limit the transfer of commercial innovation into military use. By comparing these national trajectories, the study elucidates the institutional environments that enable or hinder the translation of commercial technological prowess into military capability, offering broader implications for understanding the evolving dynamics of defense innovation and the future balance of power in AI-driven warfare.
