Description
With the rise of China and an intensification of great power competition in recent decades, small states are attempting to foreground a middle position between the two without explicitly choosing one great power over the other – an approach commonly known as hedging. I challenge the notion that great power competition is the only structural driver that small states strive to hedge. Instead, I argue that they are hedging against the risks stemming from the multipolar, interventionist and fluid international order. This expands our understanding of hedging as small states’ alignment behavior beyond (non-)choice between two great powers. In a multipolar, interventionist and fluid order, maintaining and expanding a dynamic portfolio of multi-alignment with multiple partners in multiple issue areas becomes the optimal and most preferred strategic choice for states to preserve their strategic autonomy and resilience. I draw from two Southeast Asian countries – Myanmar and Thailand – to illustrate how these states, since the beginning of the Cold War, strived to maintain and expand their portfolio of external engagements, with varying degrees of success, over time.
