Description
This presentation is based on a book chapter that critically examines the limitations of US atrocity prevention and response in Syria through the lens of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) based on official discourse and interviews with US State Department officials. Despite President Obama’s 2012 Nobel speech endorsing a broad spectrum of peaceful and coercive responses, US policy remained anchored to the objective of regime change and political transition—an aim that proved unattainable and obstructed consensus on humanitarian action. The research reveals that peaceful measures, such as diplomacy, were only considered part of R2P if they served the goal of democratic transition, thereby narrowing the scope of ‘helping to protect’. As one interviewee noted, atrocity prevention became a ‘dirty word’ in policy circles, reflecting the toxic legacy of Libya and the perceived failure in Syria. The US localised R2P as synonymous with regime change, sidelining other peaceful responses like humanitarian aid and refugee resettlement, which were treated as complementary but not integral to R2P. This framing contributed to the paralysis of R2P discourse, especially as Syria shifted from a humanitarian to a counterterrorism focus. The chapter argues that the US institutionalised R2P domestically but failed to apply it meaningfully in Syria due to inflexible political objectives. Ultimately, the chapter calls for a reframing of atrocity responses to prioritise achievable, protective measures over idealistic political outcomes. It highlights the need to confront Western exceptionalism and hypocrisy, which have undermined multilateral consensus.
