Description
CSDP began with high aspirations for the EU to build defence relevance but instead it settled for a focus on humanitarian crisis intervention. Even this faded, and now CSDP is security-driven. Its military operations, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia excepted, are naval: Atalanta, Irini, Aspides. The Franco-German driver of European Integration is in poor shape, unable to provide leadership. The UK has quit the Union. Into the breach steps the Commission, spurred by considerable worsening of the threat environment and a clear understanding that Europe cannot any longer rely on the US security umbrella. Russia's illegal war on Ukraine and Trump's second Presidency changes everything. But the Commission is not a lawmaker and in security and defence has no executive power. What it does have is (some) money, and the capacity to initiate, to incentivise, and to coerce (gently). Our research highlights some risks in how the Commission seeks to increase defence capability, identifies the key instruments involved, and asks how best this potential capability uplift can be deployed?
The paper is informed by elite interviews with 40+ experts and Brussels-based officials.
