Description
This paper explores the ways in which Russian officials and experts have employed strategic narratives about perceived successes, failures and ambiguous results of peace and arms control negotiations in Russia’s past (as these are constructed in Russia’s state-sponsored memories) to interpret and reinterpret the limits of the possible and desirable in ending or continuing Russia’s war against Ukraine. Contributing to the literature on the politics of memory and the debate on how selective and constantly evolving interpretations of the past feed into strategic cultures and underpin strategic communication in war time, the paper focuses on the role of changing memories of Russia’s past negotiations in Russia’s discourses about the Russo-Ukrainian war. It is particularly interested in how strategic narratives of past successes, failures and ambiguous results are linked to changing understandings of Russia’s international status. The paper employs narrative analysis to examine how Russia’s narratives of negotiations and international status have changed since 2014 and reflects on the implications of these changes for Russia’s international behavior.
