Description
Amidst Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in 2022, coordinated and orchestrated attempts to sow discord and manipulate the public opinion of its adversaries underwent significant strategic growth and adaptation, particularly in the digital information environment, outsourcing its influence work to a diverse and complex array of actors. Combining deception, distortion, and disinformation, Russian Information Operations (IOs) formed a coordinated and persistent campaign advancing the Kremlin’s strategic aims through distinct yet interconnected operators, each with specific identities, targets, and methods.
Drawing on Émile Durkheim’s theory of the division of labour, this paper develops a novel analytical framework for examining Russian influence information operations. To understand the division of labour within one part of this complex, evolving and persistent operation, Durkheim’s concepts can be applied to the case study of the Doppelgänger operation. This study collected the operation’s data over 24 days, from June 18 to July 11, 2024, by monitoring Doppelgänger bots posting URLs on X/Twitter. Through the application of Durkheim’s concepts of specialisation, task differentiation, and coordination, the analysis traces how distinct operational functions, such as content creation, amplification, and the use of proxy media, interact to disseminate messaging on Ukraine at scale while simultaneously obscuring attribution. The findings reveal patterns of linguistic specialisation and coordinated timing around major diplomatic events, including synchronisation with other influence information operations. This demonstrates how Doppelgänger mobilises a division of labour to shape discourse on Ukraine within a wider system of information confrontation.
