Description
Military alliances are often seen as hierarchical security institutions in which materially powerful members use ‘sticks’ (threats of abandonment) and ‘carrots’ (reassurance) to shape the behaviour of their weaker alliance partners. However, institutionalised alliances provide protégés with opportunities to bargain for more favourable terms rather than merely accepting their patron’s preferences or leaving the alliance. Within these bargaining processes, weaker allies may employ two distinct strategies: They can cultivate a reputation as a “loyal ally” and leverage their record of allegiance or, alternatively, signal disengagement - by abstaining from military exercises, delaying or refusing cooperation, or even threatening withdrawal - to bargain with their major power partners. Under what conditions do weaker allies adopt loyalty-based bargaining strategies, and when do they turn to disengagement threats?
To address this question, the paper examines the bargaining strategies employed by Armenia in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) using process tracing and expert interviews. While Armenia maintained the image of a loyal ally of Russia and CSTO member states until 2022, it has increasingly resorted to disengagement signals, culminating in the ‘suspension’ of its CSTO membership in 2024. The analysis reveals how unmet security expectations reduced the effectiveness of loyalty and prompted Armenia to re-assess its patrons’ reliability, resulting in a shift toward disengagement threat-based bargaining.
By examining intra-alliance bargaining dynamics and how weaker allies bargain with their major power patrons to secure reassurance, this paper contributes to our understanding of how weaker states can exercise agency and bargain with materially stronger partners within hierarchical security institutions.
