Description
This paper provides a comparative overview of the European Union's and Russia's entangled 'exceptionalisms' in light of the ongoing crisis of the Liberal International Order (LIO). It applies Holsti's definition of 'exceptionalism' as comprising responsibility, obligation or mission to liberate others; freedom from external constraints in realising that mission; hostility of the surrounding world; need for external enemies; and a tendency to portray oneself as a victim to both entities. It subsequently places the two exceptionalisms in the broader context of this changing world order. As a Kantian mission to liberate Europe itself from a Westphalian past through economic and political integration, the European Union’s ‘exceptionalism’ – if it can be termed as such - has, since the end of the Cold War, largely conformed to the requirements of that LIO. By contrast, Russia’s ‘hybrid’ form of exceptionalism has long placed itself, and a claimed ‘sphere of special interest’ in an ambiguous relationship with the West, and, more recently evolving from tolerance to pushback of the post-Cold War EU project. With the International Order moving away from its post-Cold War liberal iteration, the paper continues by exploring the ability of either exceptionalism to adapt to and operate within new, illiberal global realities; it concludes by laying out possible future scenarios for EU-Russian relations based on different possible adaptations.
