Description
Drawing on international legitimacy theory and historical institutionalism, this paper examines how Regional Economic Communities (RECs) navigate tensions between democracy promotion and sovereignty norms in Africa. While ECOWAS and the African Union have developed election observation mechanisms and responses to unconstitutional changes, their effectiveness varies dramatically. Through a comparative analysis of ECOWAS interventions in The Gambia (2017, successful) versus Niger (2023, contested), and a contrast of ECOWAS assertiveness with SADC's reluctance, this paper identifies three constraints: non-interference principles lead to selective enforcement; member states' democratic deficits erode credibility; and resource limitations limit capacity.
Yet RECs have evolved conditional intervention norms when crises threaten regional stability. The paper argues that the effectiveness of RECs depends on the commitment of the hegemon (Nigeria in ECOWAS), the type of crisis (coups versus electoral fraud), and external support structures. This challenges the literature that assumes regional organisations simply aggregate member preferences, demonstrating how institutional design and normative evolution create autonomous agency. By examining how domestic politics within powerful states and external actors (such as EU conditionality and Chinese engagement) shape RECs’ behaviour, the paper contributes to debates on Southern-led governance architectures and post-colonial institutionalism.
