Description
This paper interrogates the future of liberalism in a post-hegemonic world order. Liberal internationalism, dominant since the Cold War’s end, rested on two interlinked assumptions: the universality of liberal ideals and the disciplining power of Western hegemony. Historically, these cosmopolitan ambitions were inseparable from the hegemonic status of Britain and the United States, whose material and normative power enabled liberalism’s global spread. Today, liberalism's hegemonic pillar has eroded. The liberal West faces internal fragmentation and declining relative power, while non-Western actors—China, Russia, India, and others—advance alternative modernities, challenging liberalism’s monopoly on progress. The paper subsequently argues that liberalism’s inability to adapt to these realities has produced two dangerous delusions: the persistence of a Western “security community” and the feasibility of continued universal proselytism. Both are untenable in a world marked by illiberal resurgence, transnational authoritarianism, and the weaponisation of interdependence. If liberal societies cling to universalist pretensions, they risk accelerating their own decline. As an alternative, the paper proposes a shift from liberal cosmopolitanism to a progressive, communitarian republicanism grounded in non-domination rather than proselytism. This entails four key transformations: (1) abandoning ideological expansionism in favour of a renewed Westphalian restraint; (2) subordinating markets to politics to mitigate external and internal domination; (3) reinforcing boundaries between citizens and internal and external interest groups to protect democratic integrity; and (4) cultivating civic virtue to counter the erosion of public life. Such a framework rejects both liberal hubris and reactionary civilisationism, offering instead a modest, pluralist order of “entangled civilisations” coexisting without hegemonic pretensions.
