Description
Comparative political theory (CPT) is often presented as a remedy for Eurocentrism, promising more capacious engagements with non-Western traditions. Yet the aspiration to compare presupposes that political theory can encounter another ontological world without first determining in advance what counts as intelligible. Existing critiques by Sanjay Seth, Roxanne Euben, and Leigh Jenco have shown how CPT continues to rely on Western epistemic norms. This paper extends these critiques by arguing that the problem is not merely epistemic. Rather, CPT exposes a deeper metaphysical limit within Western political theory itself. Drawing on a Heideggerian account of the closure of Western metaphysics, I suggest that CPT activates a disciplinary “death drive,” since in attempting to reach an outside that might extend its horizon, political theory confronts the impossibility of relation under a singular metaphysical world.
The argument is developed through a reading of Voltaire’s intellectual engagement with the ancient Chinese sage Confucius. Voltaire’s re-articulations of Confucius’ philsophy is not simply an example of Enlightenment misinterpretation, but a demonstration of the structural dynamic at issue. The metaphysical horizon through which Voltaire read rendered Confucian thought commensurable with secular rationalism before it could appear on its own terms. Even had he fully understood Confucian theological commitments that would trouble this commensurability, the encounter could not have appeared as an encounter. This early use of comparison in political philosophy demonstrates the finitude of political theory’s world, a finitude that foregrounds the limitations of CPT.
