Description
Populism is often understood as rhetorical opposition between “the people” and “the elites,” and frequently associated with climate denialism. This paper examines a different and increasingly consequential configuration: populist leadership in regional powers that are simultaneously drivers of carbon-intensive growth and acutely climate-vulnerable. Specifically, it focuses on Narendra Modi (India) and Prabowo Subianto (Indonesia) and conceptualises both leaders as navigating dual climate policy roles.
On one side, India and Indonesia continue to expand industrial production, energy demand and resource extraction, for example of coal, nickel, and deforestation. This both reflects developmental priorities and, at times, convergence with climate-rollback positions similar to those of Donald Trump. On the other side, both states are deeply vulnerable to climate harms, for instance through heatwaves, coastal erosion, or floodings. They use these vulnerabilities to consolidate a Global South voice that advocates for CBDR, climate finance and technology transfer. Crucially, both India and Indonesia are regional powers with significant traction in South Asia and Southeast Asia respectively. Thus, their climate discourse contributes to the construction of an emerging international climate dis(order): a fragmented landscape of overlapping cooperation, resistance, and contested responsibility.
Empirically, the paper analyses political speeches, summit interventions and social media performances. Its analysis shows that Global South populist climate politics cannot be reduced to Western-style climate denialism, nor do they fully align with liberal climate governance. Instead, they produce selective cooperation, which supports decarbonisation and adaptation when it enhances national influence but resists external conditionality and reframes burden-sharing onto the Global North.
