Description
This paper examines the 2011 humanitarian intervention in Côte d’Ivoire through a pragmatic analytical framework, arguing that the problem in humanitarian intervention lies not in regime change itself, but in the manner of its execution. The intervention succeeded in halting violence, restoring order, and rebuilding governance under Alassane Ouattara, yet it also revealed how partiality and weak accountability can erode international consensus. Using a triangular framework of humanitarian needs, good governance, and international consensus, the paper evaluates how the operation met the first two goals but failed to secure the third. Through process tracing, it shows that Côte d’Ivoire’s relative stability resulted from a convergence of pragmatic conditions: regional legitimacy, a clear mandate, and domestic governance capacity. However, UNOCI and French involvement blurred the line between protection and regime change, undermining the legitimacy of the outcome. Viewing intervention pragmatically highlights that sustaining international support for humanitarian intervention requires anchoring interventions in regional legitimacy, ensuring mandate precision, maintaining impartiality and accountability, and securing credible prospects for post-conflict governance when regime change delivers humanitarian success.
