Description
International statebuilding interventions have had a checkered history, often marked by failure. Key explanations for these persistent failures blame outsiders for their poor understanding of local contexts, unrealistic time frames, the imposition of ill-suited models, conflicting objectives set by external actors, and the failure to allocate power in a way that reflects the reality on the ground. This article takes a step back to argue that international intervenors and local populations have divergent expectations for how they expect states to function. In transitioning from war to peace, the overarching goal for external intervenors has been to "transform" what is perceived as a "fragile" state into a strong state underpinned by liberal values. This transformation entails a significant shift in governance norms, moving away from a local, clientelist model of the state towards an idealized model of democratic governance. However, this shift rests on the universality of five key statebuilding assumptions: (i) States are inherently good; (ii) More stateness leads to better outcomes; (iii) Rule of law will prevail over social norms; (iv) Peace dividends trickle down; and (v) Stability and good governance are mutually reinforcing. This article argues that, even as these five fallacies underpin the framework for international statebuilding, they do not actually match the lived reality in fragile states. As such, these five fallacies offer an alternative and complementary explanation for the failure of statebuilding. This study underscores how these flawed assumptions, ingrained in the framework of international statebuilding, have consistently contributed to its shortcomings.
