Description
This paper examines how authority emerges in and around international organisations (IOs) without prior contractual delegation by states. Using the case of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and their transgovernmental network, GANHRI, it develops the concept of delegation without design. The Paris Principles were drafted by NHRI officials in 1991, annexed by the UN Commission on Human Rights and endorsed by the General Assembly in 1993, then operationalised through GANHRI’s Sub-Committee on Accreditation, which regulates NHRI access to UN forums. This causal pathway is under-specified within Principal-Agent models that presuppose ex ante contracting, unified principals and predefined control mechanisms. The paper theorises a reflexive mechanism of authority formation grounded in peer coordination, recursive review and strategic ambiguity, amounting to an organisation of self-organisation subsequently legitimated by states within IO procedures. Methodologically, it employs process tracing drawing on archival materials, UN records and interviews. The contribution is two-fold, it refines IO scholarship on delegation by identifying how regulatory authority can emerge through networked practice, and it specifies when and how IOs can institutionalise non-state generated standards into participation and compliance rules without treaty design.
