Description
How do powerful states control policy implementation in international organizations (IOs)? We argue that agency of individuals and interpersonal relations between them are overlooked aspects of how states exercise informal control over IO policy implementation. To understand it, we propose the concept of graduated control. States can choose from three mechanisms of informal control: joint forums, strategic appointments, and intermittent meddling. A joint forum involves officials from both member states and the IO cooperating closely on the implementation of an IO programme. This is the costliest mechanism of informal control since it places significant demands on member state representatives’ time, weakens the perceived IO legitimacy, and risks information diffusion. Strategic appointments entail lobbying to place citizens of the country that exercises informal control in key roles within a particular IO programme. Such citizens then coordinate with state officials in the capital or in the field. This is the medium-cost option since such lobbying requires time and diplomatic capital and may also undermine the perceived IO legitimacy. The least costly option, intermittent meddling, consists of sporadic communication between member state representatives and IO officials through ad hoc channels, such as relaying one-off messages through embassies, intermediaries, or in-person encounters. The choice of informal control mechanisms depends on the strength of a member states’ national interests in the country hosting the IO programme. Strong interests justify the costs of a joint forum, while medium interests are likely to lead to a preference for strategic appointments and weak interest to intermittent meddling. We demonstrate the logic behind these choices with case studies of three UN peacekeeping interventions – in Haiti, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – based on more than 150 interviews with former and current UN officials.
