Description
Those who draft resolutions in International Organizations (IOs) can significantly influence their content and acceptance, yet not all states are interested in drafting, so-called “penholding.” Veto powers Russia and China barely draft any Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. In the African Union (AU), states rely on drafting by international bureaucrats or independent experts. Why (not) hold the pen? The prevailing focus on the benefits of penholding has left the disadvantages and trade-offs underexplored: penholding can provide agenda-setting, position-taking, and informational advantages, but states may avoid drafting to reap efficiency gains, shift blame for negotiation failures, and preserve state sovereignty. When choosing whether to penhold, states weigh up the advantages and disadvantages. States may resolve this trade-off by delegating some or all tasks associated with penholdership (e.g. leading negotiations, writing the initial draft). We distinguish between four types of negotiating states based on their delegation choices regarding penholding. We explore the (dis)advantages of these choices through case studies of the UNSC and AU Peace and Security Council, drawing on interview and archival research. This paper thus challenges the prevailing assumption that penholdership is a generally desirable role, while showing that drafting procedures and states’ delegation choices affect decision-making outcomes in IOs.
