Description
The Antarctic Treaty has effectively maintained peace, scientific cooperation, and environmental protection in the region, yet its domestic implementation shows significant variation among European Parties. Despite collective adoption, Measures 4 (2004) and 1 (2005) on human safety and environmental liability did not enter into force due to missing national implementations. This study investigates which domestic factors explain these differences, focusing on bureaucratic, infrastructural, and coercive capacities as outlined by the Managerial School of International Relations. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) across 12 European Antarctic national programmes, the research examines how internal approval processes, funding structures, institutional arrangements, and legislative requirements influence implementation outcomes. Results indicate that dedicated polar funding and prior ratification of similar conventions are sufficient conditions for implementation when polar management bodies are subordinated to administrations. Conversely, in the absence of dedicated funding, greater autonomy of these bodies can also foster implementation. These findings reveal how domestic institutional and political-legal configurations shape compliance with collectively agreed Antarctic Treaty measures, offering insights into the interplay between international governance and national policymaking capacities in environmental governance.
