Description
This paper examines the mission leadership response to troop misconduct, harm, and fatalities during the UN's first armed mission to Egypt and the Gaza Strip, UNEF (1956-1967). I argue that, although the troops conceived of and prepared for external threats (from state soldiers, civilians, the environment, etc), the greatest threat to troop – and civilian – life (on patrol and off-duty) was the troops themselves. I show how paternalist and patriarchal logics of peacekeeping placed the short-term international soldiers in largely unobserved positions of authority over civilian communities, even once the conflict had deescalated. As a novel international military, UNEF staff were anxious to artificially – and swiftly – gel the battalions together so as to cultivate mission identity, enable strategic cooperation, and prevent troop boredom, as well as maintain a steady turnover of volunteers on the ground. This existential anxiety forged a prioritisation of troop morale in quotidian life on patrol, resulting in a generous recreational and welfare programme. Recreational activities relied on the troops’ shared (and presumed) masculinity and heterosexuality as the easiest ways to encourage cosmopolitan friendships. Despite repeated mission investigations, a field-based culture of drinking combined with a lack of regulation and a prioritisation of troop morale continued to cause frequent vehicle incidents, drownings, and ‘accidental’ fatalities or suicides – harming numerous civilians and peacekeepers – far more than those killed on duty. Using Egyptian police reports and UNEF inquiry documents, this paper explores how the UN mission made sense of these injuries and deaths through gendered and individualised approach, preventing any meaningful reflection on harmful mission cultures.
