Description
The growing integration of commercial and civilian space systems into military operations has shifted the strategic paradigm of spacepower from one of dual-use advantage to dual-risk vulnerability. States now rely on privately owned and institutionally governed space infrastructure for core defence functions without possessing sovereign control over their operation. This diffusion of authority fragments command, introduces strategic latency, and enables adversaries to exploit commercial actors through cyber intrusion, grey-zone coercion, and legal ambiguity. As a result, deterrence - traditionally grounded in state ownership, unity of political and operational control, and predictable signalling - has been structurally weakened. This article argues that the challenge is not commercialisation itself, but the absence of mechanisms to govern it in support of national strategy. Through shared resilience, pre-delegated authority, and harmonised allied governance, states can restore credible spacepower and reassert sovereignty in an era defined by dependence.
