Description
Within the context of the ‘new cold war’, resulting in a wedged bi-polar system emerging in the Indo-Pacific, there are growing vulnerabilities associated with independent, stable, and doctrinally entrenched strategic positions. Post-colonial states such as India have looked to escape the pressures of heightened great power competition to assert their interests as they harness institutional mechanisms and benefits extended by both rivals in the great power contest. The existing literature characterises India’s behaviour as either balancing or hedging vis-à-vis the United States and China. The article seeks to provide a new conceptual anchoring of post-colonial state behaviour by introducing ‘strategic liminality’ as an explanation. Strategic liminality reveals the complex, unfixed, and multifaceted nature of discursive repertoire shaping India’s sense of self vis-à-vis its engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The analysis aims at making three substantial interventions. Firstly, it problematises the conventional, Eurocentric balance of power theory in the context of non-Western states. Secondly, it delineates the structural conditions under which India has resorted to being ‘strategically liminal’ since the COVID-19 pandemic. Lastly, strategic liminality as a novel conceptualisation provides a model to explain state behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, characterised by skilful bargaining behaviour within the power structure of the region. By dissecting India’s diplomatic behaviour, the article demonstrates how it has creatively utilized strategic liminality to pursue foreign policy goals and economic objectives.
