2–5 Jun 2026
Europe/London timezone

The Logics and Limits of Hedging in Foreign Policy: Evidence from Brazil and Mexico

5 Jun 2026, 09:00

Description

This article refines the concept of hedging in foreign policy and examines whether and how Brazil and Mexico hedge amid China’s rise, shifts in U.S. foreign policy, and evolving U.S.-China relations. We define hedging as a strategy to reduce risks from perceived overdependence on one or more stronger powers. To broaden its application beyond Southeast Asia, we propose a typology of hedging that accounts for regional and thematic variation. We compare the foreign policy approaches of four administrations partly overlapping with Trump’s first term: Bolsonaro (2019–22) and Lula (2023–24) in Brazil; Peña Nieto (2016–18) and AMLO (2018–24) in Mexico. Using original analysis of presidential tweets, we assess attitudes toward China, the United States, and their bilateral relationship. We find that Brazil pursued untethered hedging under both Bolsonaro and Lula—reactively in the former case and proactively in the latter. Mexico’s approach remained North-facing; Peña Nieto attempted limited hedging via Asia-Pacific ties, but without sustained diplomacy. Under AMLO, hedging was largely aspirational. By combining conceptual and empirical insights, the article contributes to understanding hedging in Latin America and highlights how middle powers exercise agency, albeit within significant structural constraints.

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