Description
Examining interpersonal trust between state leaders from different conflict parties is increasingly held to be important when considering foreign policy decision-making around bilateral negotiations. This, however, is not the only context in which interpersonal relations matter. The relationship between key individuals within a conflict party, such as that between a state leader and their foreign minister, can impact foreign policy decision-making around the development of conflict negotiations. These relationships can be marked by trust, but can equally be consumed by distrust. This paper examines how the relationship of managed distrust between a state leader and their foreign minister can impact foreign policy decision-making during conflict negotiations and whether trust can be built from that distrust management. I focus on the relations between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and examine how these political rivals managed to work together during the 1992-1993 Oslo negotiations despite a history of distrust. I find that the relationship between the two men was managed through a combination of three mechanisms: an informal agreement that set out how they would work together; institutionalising one-to-one meetings; and by selecting negotiators who reflected and represented both men’s interests.
