Description
When assessing the morality of economic sanctions, many philosophers argue for applying just war theory because they believe that the severe economic hardships sanctions impose are as harmful and deadly as war. This move, therefore, is based on a single, empirical claim about the consequences of sanctions. However, this straightforward application of the just war theory has recently faced criticism on two fronts. First, some pointed out that certain forms of sanctions, such as arms embargoes, unlike war, do not involve acts of killing. Second, others argued that continuing trade with certain states, such as buying natural resources from authoritarian regimes, contributes to severe human rights violations. They contended that sanctions, in contrast, are a “clean hands” measure intended to halt complicity in wrongdoing rather than to inflict harm. While these critiques reveal the problematic “double analogy”—equating sanctions with war and trade with peace—they fail to address a more fundamental question: Under what conditions do sanctions constitute an act of “killing?” This article addresses this question, arguing that the moral status of sanctions is more complex than previously acknowledged because whether sanctions constitute killing depends on the relationship between the trading parties and the sanction enforcers. Since sanctions sometimes amount to killing, while at other times they do not, the essential first step in assessing their moral permissibility is to determine whether, in a specific situation, imposing them—or conversely, maintaining trade—constitutes an act of killing. This determination must precede the application of any moral framework, whether it is just war theory or another.
