Description
The coordination problems among Israel’s intelligence and security agencies, coupled with the failure to assess critical intelligence, exposed a significant structural weakness in Israel’s security architecture. The “October 7 Attack” carried out by Hamas has thus become a focal case for examining Israel’s intelligence system within the theoretical framework of “intelligence weakness” and “intelligence failure.” The incident revealed how institutional misjudgments and cognitive biases can collectively undermine strategic decision-making. Israel’s long-held assumption that Hamas lacked the capacity to conduct a complex and large-scale attack fostered a cognitive bias that led to critical missteps. Warnings from border units (IDF) were disregarded, resulting in the amplification of the attack’s impact. This failure underscores deficiencies in the tripartite coordination mechanism between AMN-IDF, Shin Bet/Shabak, and Mossad agencies that historically played key roles in Israel’s national security structure. The inability of this system to function effectively during the crisis raises questions about inter-agency communication and the broader decision-making culture within Israel’s defense establishment. Moreover, the incident has highlighted how gender-based perceptions within the Israeli military may represent an additional layer of cognitive bias, influencing both intelligence collection and the evaluation of critical information. By analyzing qualitative, case-based data, the study draws upon recent findings in intelligence literature to reassess the underlying causes of the October 7 intelligence breakdown. This analysis contributes to ongoing debates in intelligence studies by offering a comprehensive, case-based explanation of theoretical and practical failures while presenting new arguments not previously explored in the literature.
