Description
What makes citizens perceive the demands of another state as maximalist? How do perceptions of maximalism shape policy responses? I assess these questions using a preregistered survey experiment in Spain, set in the hypothetical context of a maritime boundary dispute. Respondents are presented with a maritime claim by a neighboring country and asked to assess how maximalist it appears and what foreign policy responses their government should take in return. I argue that identical claims can be perceived differently depending on the identity of the claim maker and how much support the claim is said to enjoy under international law. Specifically, claims attributed to autocracies and those described as having weak international legal backing are expected to be seen as more maximalist. I also expect that perceived maximalism increases support for unilateral or coercive policy responses. The results show that both the size of the claim and the regime type of the claimant affect how maximalist the claim is perceived to be, as well as the likelihood of supporting coercive responses. Contrary to expectations, information about international law has no effect on perceptions or foreign policy preferences. These findings contribute to our understanding of how citizens evaluate demands and how such perceptions may influence international dispute processes.
