Description
Which post-crisis global financial governance signals are interpreted as credibility-enhancing by key market gatekeepers? Classic principal-agent accounts expect delegation, monitoring, and policy constraints to strengthen commitment and increase market confidence. This paper presents an alternative theoretical account by developing the notion of market-mediated credibility. It argues that credibility in global financial governance is partly produced through private-sector intermediaries, especially credit rating agencies (CRAs), whose evaluative logic differs from institutionalist expectations. Rather than rewarding institutional strength as such, CRAs may privilege signals that combine reputational validation with short-term stability, policy flexibility and access to liquidity. Empirically, the paper uses sovereign credit ratings as a proxy for how market gatekeepers interpret international financial commitments. It examines three post-2008 arrangements that embody distinct credibility signals: soft-law coordination through the Financial Stability Board, regional supervisory oversight through the European Systemic Risk Board, and liquidity insurance through Federal Reserve swap lines. Using panel data for 47 countries from 2005 to 2016, the findings suggest that club-like coordination and discretionary liquidity support are associated with more positive rating effects than formalized oversight. The paper, therefore, challenges the assumption that stronger delegation automatically enhances credibility. It contributes to research in Global Governance and International Political Economy by showing how the credibility of global financial governance is mediated, translated, and reworked by the same private market actors, who then evaluate member states' creditworthiness.