Description
Policymakers and commentators are increasingly debating Ukraine’s post-war security through Cold War precedents: the ‘West German model’ of gradual integration into Western security structures, and the ‘Korea model’ of an armistice along a frozen front line. Both models presuppose that Russia will accept a bounded outcome in which Ukraine survives as a protected sovereign state, rather than seeking the full subjugation of Ukraine. Yet Russia’s declared aims remain maximalist, pointing to Ukraine’s complete conquest. This calls into question whether either model’s central precondition, that Russia would accept a bounded settlement, can hold. This paper tests the conditions behind each model against Ukraine, including whether a credible guarantor remains available, from either the US under the current administration or Europe. It argues that the conditions behind these analogies do not hold in Ukraine’s case, meaning they offer false comfort rather than a workable template. It warns that a freeze built upon a false template could enable Russia to rearm and return, increasing the risk that Ukraine’s post-war settlement becomes a pathway to renewed war, and potentially wider escalation involving NATO.