Description
Post-conflict security arrangements often require ex-combatants to place their safety in the hands of the state institutions they once fought, yet the individual dimensions of this transition remain underexplored in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) literatures. This paper addresses that gap through a case study of Colombia's security architecture following the 2016 peace agreement, focusing on the National Protection Unit (UNP), the body responsible for evaluating risk and assigning protection measures to FARC-EP peace signatories. The UNP operates under an institutional design that formally codifies trust as a prerequisite for effective protection: Decree 299 of 2017 requires that personnel in its Special Subdirectorate hold the endorsement of Comunes, the political party that emerged from the FARC-EP. A decade after the agreement, this arrangement faces mounting pressure. Fragmentation within the signatory community, administrative reforms imposed without consultation, and the killing of over 400 former combatants have strained the legitimacy of the protection system from within.
Drawing on in-depth interviews with UNP personnel and peace signatories, this paper examines how this architecture of trust is lived, contested, and managed from the inside, centering on risk analysts designated by Comunes and peace signatories navigating the renegotiation of wartime cognitive frameworks in a post-conflict setting.