Description
How do the stages of peace negotiations impact insurgent group's targeting of civilians during armed conflict? I argue that different forms of conciliatory measures affect violence by altering the strategic calculus of armed groups in different ways, creating incentives to escalate or de-escalate violence. Negotiations succeed in de-escalating violence only when two enabling conditions are jointly satisfied: armed groups believe the state will honour its commitments, and the strategic gains from de-escalation outweigh the organizational costs of abandoning violence. Where those conditions are absent, specific stages in the negotiation can actively incentivize spoiler groups to increase rather than reduce violence. To test this theory, I employ a quantitative research design that leverages time-series panel data of attacks on civilians during armed conflict. The results attest to the difficulty in reaching the two enabling conditions. As a result, no agreement stage is robustly associated with reduced targeting of civilians. Partial agreements, the most common stage, are associated with about 13% more violence, and renewal of pre-negotiation agreements are linked to an increase of roughly 28% in the targeting of civilians. The findings provide quantitative evidence that supports theorizing and recommendations on spoiler dynamics during earlier stages in peace negotiations.