Description
Advances in intelligence are commonly expected to reduce the risk of conflict by improving information about adversaries. If states possess more accurate information about an opponent’s resolve, they should be better able to avoid bargaining failures that lead to war. This paper shows that the argument is incomplete. We develop a formal model of crisis bargaining in a nuclear dyad in which one state receives a noisy signal about its opponent’s resolve and capabilities. Improvements in intelligence increase the precision of this signal and therefore improve estimates of adversary’s willingness to fight. Better information, however, does more than reduce uncertainty. It also changes bargaining incentives. As states become better able to identify weakly resolved opponents, they can condition their demands more closely on these assessments. Under some conditions, this induces more coercive bargaining behavior and increases the risk of bargaining failure. The paper identifies a mechanism through which improvements in intelligence may increase rather than reduce the risk of conflict. More broadly, it suggests that technological advances in intelligence can change strategic behavior in ways that are not explained by conventional theories linking better information to greater stability. We apply the framework on Iraq 2003 war as the case study.