Description
Recent global upheavals have had a profound influence on international architecture, and nowhere is this more visible than in Southeast Asia. For decades, the region’s foreign policy has rested on hedging – avoiding binary choices while relying on the US for security commitments and China for economic benefits. Discussions on US-China ‘rapprochement’ often assume that reduced great-power competition will lower pressure on states caught in the middle of this rivalry. This paper argues the opposite: reduced great power confrontation does not simply lower tension; instead, it reconfigures risks and opportunities. The paper studies the effect of recent transactional de-escalation and bilateral reproachment between the US and China – highlighted by the Busan trade truce and the Beijing Summit – in Southeast Asia. The study finds that rather than easing regional pressure, the rapprochement has exposed the region's vulnerability by undermining the credibility of US security commitments, recalibrating the scope of Chinese economic statecraft, and narrowing the bargaining space available to regional countries. The paper concludes that while Southeast Asian countries are already diversifying and hedging against the scenario, they should reinvest collectively in ASEAN’s institutional core. The paper contributes to understanding the limits of middle-power agency amid great-power rapprochement.
Keywords: Southeast Asia, US-China rapprochement, Hedging, ASEAN, Risk and Opportunity