Description
This paper explores the changing meanings and practices of state sovereignty vis-à-vis international climate finance while executing climate mitigation projects in developing countries. It uses the concept of “sovereignty bargain” developed by Karen Litfin (1997) to argue that developing countries have established a set of sovereignty-claims in relation to international climate finance through international climate change negotiations. However, while executing the projects funded by international climate finance domestically, national governments often renegotiate these claims leading to a loss of sovereignty for them. As a case in point, the paper focuses on India’s solar park scheme, the “Development of Solar Parks and Ultra-Mega Solar Power Projects”, under the National Solar Mission. Part one of the paper theorizes the relationship between state sovereignty and international climate finance as a set of sovereignty-claims established by developing countries through UNFCCC principles like CBDR-RC. Part two studies the plug-and-play model of India’s Bhadla (Rajasthan) and Rewa (Madhya Pradesh) solar parks, wherein the state provides infrastructural and fiscal incentives to international climate finance and Solar Power Developers to mitigate risks associated with these projects. Part three analyzes how the Indian state loses its sovereignty-claims in these projects due to the asymmetrical nature of risk-sharing among the different stakeholders. In conclusion, the paper argues that the gap in theory and practice of state sovereignty is symptomatic of the conflict between the international and national politics of climate change.