Description
Worthington, in his incisive 2003 study of governance in Singapore, identified the executive function of the Singapore state as being much comprised of a far more expansive group of actors than simply the government executive comprised of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Rather, he identified executive power in Singapore as being located within and exercised through a series of overlapping relationships between political elites and a series of core institutions, actors and individuals that are at once separate from but profoundly imbricated with the core political executive. These include elites within the civil service and bureaucracy, members and executives of major statutory boards, government linked companies (GLCs), government holding companies and major enterprises owned indirectly by the government. The ideologies of pragmatic authoritarianism, communitarian values and “meritocratic” elite-control over Singaporean government have been hailed as comprising a Singaporean School of socio-economic and political development worthy of export to other countries, especially in the E and SE Asian Region. Yet, while much has been made of the implications of these forms of governance upon domestic regulation and policy making, comparatively little attention has been paid to their influence on foreign policy. This paper explores the ways in which Singapore’s hybrid form of governance acts to provide unique arenas in which foreign policy is created, refined and contested. Further, it points to the ways in which government linked (yet nominally “arms-length”) bodies operate as vehicles for the pursuit of Singapore’s foreign policy objectives, and in support of both domestic foreign policy legitimacy and positive international perceptions of Singapore’s international positioning and ambitions.
