Description
This paper follows Ludwig Wittgenstein’s investigations into the stability and also flux inherent in our capacity to create and interpret meaning. What is the role of judgment in forming ethical precepts, even in the absence of universal referents that otherwise might be thought to guarantee shared understanding? I argue that Wittgenstein’s novel position on the epistemological conditions in which ethical positions are established lend his insights primary political relevance: just as meaningful linguistic use is possible despite a lack of foundational referents, political judgments about ethics are made without recourse to ultimately stable or universal grounding. Yet agreement in use and in judgments is nevertheless vital, especially to understand political judgements which are forged in a pluralistic space of contested – and thus shifting – conceptual parameters. From this starting point, I then elaborate how we can – despite conditions of uncertainty – nevertheless critique political concepts, exercise political judgment, and articulate ethical principles in times of crisis.
