Description
Resolving self-determination conflicts through self-determination and partition has been controversial. One strand of the literature optimistically claims that creating a new state based on a common identity strengthens the prospect of peace and democracy while the other strand of the literature is more pessimistic, arguing that there is no such guarantee.
This literature, however, has been disconnected from another relevant subfield: international peacebuilding. Considering that the two most recent cases of de jure partition—East Timor and South Sudan—were accompanied by significant international peacebuilding efforts, the international dimension should not be disregarded. This paper aims at understanding these two cases, not yet studied in the partition literature, through examining both local and international dynamics. Specifically, it analyzes why, despite significant international involvement, both cases experienced troubles, albeit in a different degree: the 2006 Crisis and the 2013 Civil War respectively.
In line with the theories of pessimists, I show that homogenous support for independence in these two cases did not indicate the lack of internal divisions. However, observing the unity of pro-independence groups up to the referendum, international actors wrongly adopted the logic of optimists. As a result, they assumed that the unity would continue after independence, that the unity indicated that no tensions existed within the pro-independence groups, and that the unity meant democratization would not be difficult. Failing to understand the local dynamics, they were not well placed to prevent the 2006 Crisis and the 2013 Civil War.
