Description
To date, existing research on peacebuilding and conflict management has generally treated Russia as a challenger to the liberal peace paradigm. Yet the simplistic labeling of Russia as an ‘authoritarian’ or ‘illiberal’ conflict manager whose ideas and interests are presupposed to oppose those of Western liberal peacebuilders obscures the complex processes of norm contestation in the evolution of the liberal peacebuilding order. The conventional narrative is that Moscow is opposed to liberal peace missions that champion political pluralism and decentralized governance. In this context, Russia has been often framed as an ‘autocracy promoter’ who relentlessly seeks to install despotically strong and centralized governments in conflict-affected states. While this appears to be the case in Syria, other cases show opposite tendencies. In fact, in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan/Armenia, and Ukraine, Russia often intervened on behalf of ethnic minorities and advanced a policy that challenged the authority of central governments. Empirically, Russia’s image as ‘autocracy promoter’ in conflict-affected states is hence constructed on a small number of high profile cases such as Syria, and does not accurately represent the whole repertoire of Russian practices in conflict-affected states. In light of this, this paper argues that Russian ‘challenge’ to the liberal peace does not only come from the promotion of ‘illiberal’ norms, but also from the co-optation and tactical mobilization of liberal norms to advance its strategic interests.
