Description
Why do states sometimes publicly admit to breaking international law? Past cases of such “explicit breach” illustrate a phenomenon whereby a government can, under specific circumstances, benefit from openly admitting to breaking international law. We identify two sources of incentives for states when choosing to commit explicit breach: first, domestic audience benefits result from selectorates rewarding national politicians for standing up for their beliefs and serving the interests of the wider public at home, despite international legal obligations. Second, an explicit breach can appeal to international audiences and serve as a powerful tool to initiate change in the international law favourable to the breacher. These international audience benefits by dissatisfied states can therefore not only please the domestic audiences, but also result in desirable international legal change. However, states differ in their ability to benefit from the strategy of explicit breach. Only states in good international standing, defined as a combination of power and reputation, can gain such international audience benefits. Otherwise, the international audiences are more likely to punish the defiant state, reflecting badly on them, and hence making the strategy unattractive.
