Description
Over the past decade debates have grappled with the inherent dilemma that is the economic-security contradiction within the UK-Chinese relationship. This contemporary debate, at present, has been divorced from a parallel historical debate about the origins of this conundrum for British policymakers, and watershed moment in this regard, in the 1920s. Utilising archival research this paper represents a modest effort to redress that divide. To this end, this paper will explore how policymakers addressed the “Problem of China” in the wake of 1922 Washington Conference. With the events of Versailles, the May Fourth protests, the shortcomings of Washington at dealing with China itself; it was clear that British policymakers had to find a way to reconcile a burgeoning, crucially modern, Chinese nationalist movement. Gunboat diplomacy had had its day and European balance of power struggles in the “Chinese arena” were no longer sustainable. Policymakers had to confront, for the first time, the necessity of crafting a policy that was truly aimed at China. What emerges from this analysis is the difficulty of designing a policy that balanced realpolitik considerations, imperial retrenchment and overstretch, vast British commercial interests in China, an ailing China trade and a very vocal British community in China.
