Description
The conversational space for security impact of non-traditional threats of infectious diseases on the state, society and individuals has broadened among governments and political elites. Yet, its securitisation within states is not a homogenous process. Despite embracing the language of security, states attribute differing urgency, resources and policy priorities to the public health emergency. The outbreak of COVID-19, likewise, invoked varying responses from the governments ranging from preventive, reactionary to outright neglect. This article seeks to establish that domestic political factors play an instrumental role in determining and mediating responses to non-traditional security threats. Utilising the case of Taiwan, one of the few governments to pre-emptively address and successfully control the outbreak, the article discusses the effect that political leadership and institutional coordination have on state’s external and internal policy responses to the potential threat. It also reflects on Taiwan’s framing of the pandemic as a human security issue to denounce its exclusion from the World Health Organisation (WHO). In doing so, the study enriches the Securitisation framework with the empirical study of a majorly side-lined case in Asia and further addresses the policy effectiveness of the securitising and de-securitising actions.
