Description
Trade relations have linked India to the Gulf commercially, intellectually, culturally, linguistically, and religiously through history. Port cities along India’s western coast have traded with the Gulf for centuries, as evidenced by the penetration of Arabic words into regional languages spoken in western India. During the colonial period, the British saw the Gulf as part of their sphere of influence and as vital for securing all land and sea routes to their Indian Empire—the proverbial jewel in the British crown. After India gained independence in 1947, it established a strong trading relationship with the Gulf countries, which was reinforced by its leadership of the non-aligned movement and support for the Palestinian cause. However, the establishment of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in 1971 and tensions between India and Pakistan diluted India’s relationship with the Gulf. Post-1979, the Iranian Revolution and the Afghan jihad established a pattern of amity and enmity linking the South Asian and Middle Eastern Regional Security Complexes. The Iran-Saudi Arabia and India-Pakistan rivalries provided the context for a Pakistan-Saudi Arabia alliance in the Afghan jihad that was opposed by India and Iran. Nevertheless, India’s need for oil imports from the Arab Gulf, and the Arab Gulf’s need for blue-collar workers from India, ensured that India and the Arab Gulf remained economically engaged. In this chapter, I will argue that the deepening India-US friendship and the United States’ sanctions against Iran have led India to pivot away from Iran towards the Arab Gulf, as seen in recent years with the Modi government’s “Link West Policy.” Viewed through the prism of Regional Security Complex Theory, this can be understood in terms of India’s aspiration to great-power status and its consequent desire to operate beyond its region.
