Description
Remarkably few international economic regulatory bodies disappeared in the last deep deglobalisation of the 1930s. How did they survive the threats from deglobalisation, or at least bequeath capabilities to their successors? Are there lessons for contemporary regulation threatened by deglobalisation? This article presents a fresh explanation, proposing three sets of interaction dynamics. We contrast neo-Durkheimian institutional processes of ordering interacting with structural features of regulated industries, and with short term political economy forces. We identify three different categories of international economic regulatory bodies in the 1927-1939 period. The article highlights hierarchical ordering in regulatory bodies for capital-intensive physical infrastructure crossing borders exemplified by the International Telecommunications Union, which survived through highly structured relations between departments of state across countries. This contrasts with individualistic ordering and brokering in politically vulnerable agencies with indirect regulatory powers such as the League of Nations Economic and Financial Organisation. Third, a group of regimes, formed in response to deglobalisation to defend themselves from falling commodity prices, such as the International Rubber Regulation Committee, exhibited enclaved ordering. We show why contrasting political institutional ordering emerged and was sustained in each, contributing to survival. The article concludes by considering comparative relevance for contemporary risks to international regulation.