Description
One of the central problems facing the regulation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as non-state actors often contracted to carry-out state functions is establishing consistent and enforceable accountability standards both at the national and international levels. While accountability structures for PMSCs do exist, they are often fragmented, voluntary, and lack legal enforcement mechanisms. This results in widespread criticism of the regulatory regimes that exist and claims that PMSCs benefit from de facto impunity. Crucial to claims of impunity is the question, ‘impunity from whom?’; there is an underlying assumption that PMSCs should be accountable to an actor, but which actor and what form of accountability regime would ensure accountability to them. This paper will examine these questions by doing three things. First, it will examine the accountability structures that exist for PMSCs, including certifiable industry standards and regulation by contract. It shall explore whether they are equivalent to the accountability structures that exist for the armed forces and their personnel as state actors, and examine whether PMSCs do experience de facto impunity. By discussing current PMSC regulation it will be possible to establish to whom PMSCs are held accountable as non-state actors. Second, this paper will examine who is left out of PMSC accountability processes, namely the publics of countries where PMSCs are contracted. These publics are often the ones who are at risk of being directly harmed by wrongdoing in conflict situations, but as PMSCs are corporate non-state actors the majority of accountability mechanisms establish accountability to the client as the party who can experience wrongdoing. By exploring the presence, or lack thereof, of publics in the accountability process it is possible to raise the question who should PMSCs be accountable to, and how their status as a non-state actor may affect that. This question is fundamental to theorising accountability for non-state actors. Third, this paper will close by reflecting upon how current systems of PMSC regulation and accountability can inform us about what “good” accountability in conflict is considered to be; who is it for, what is it for and why do we require it. These broader questions will then highlight considerations fundamental for establishing and improving accountability processes for non-state actors in conflict and for problematising current legal accountability frameworks.
