Description
Although Iraq declared victory over ISIS in July 2017, the group has reverted to its traditional insurgency strategy and continues to generate instability across northern Iraq. This paper will argue that only an inter-disciplinary post-war recovery strategy that combines elements of security sector reform, transitional justice, and reconciliation will be able to effectively address the insurgency.
To date, the Iraqi government seems intent on repeating the mistakes of the post-2003 period which precipitated the rise of ISIS. Judicial processes against suspected ISIS members are heavily retributive and, much like the previous de-Ba’athification process, constitute collective punishment of the Sunni community. Militias such as the Hashd al-Sha’bi operate with relative impunity, and there has been no accountability for their grave violations of human rights and war crimes. There is precious little taking place in the way of reconciliation efforts to heal the deep social wounds created by conflict. While there is an understandable focus by many on the continued inter-communal Sunni-Shia tensions, intra-communal relations have been severely damaged; Sunni communities have been torn apart by ISIS, with many displaced families and tribes unable to return to their homes. For those who can return, what are they returning to? Significant parts of Sunni-majority cities like Mosul and Ramadi remain destroyed and littered with unexploded ordnances, garnering inadequate government attention, reconstruction funding, and economic investment. This paper will use the ongoing protracted displacement of over a million Iraqis to highlight the inter-related nature of the different post-war recovery processes, and the need to consider them in tandem rather than individually.
Without an inter-disciplinary approach that brings in political, social, legal, and economic considerations, Iraq will remain vulnerable and prone to prolonged insecurity.
