Description
Although the concept of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ has been at the heart of Eurosceptic discourse over the past decades, one consequence of Brexit has been the concentration of power in the hands of the UK Executive as a result of the UK’s Constitutional arrangements. This has led to Executive-Legislative tussles not just on the substantive direction of Brexit, notably on whether the UK should remain closely aligned to the EU’s customs and regulatory regime, but on the role of the UK Parliament in approving an EU exit deal. However, the tension between the discourse of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ and the politically mediated Constitutional effects of Brexit is unlikely to disappear with the UK’s exit in January 2020. Focusing on trade policy – a new competence being repatriated that has been at the heart of post-referendum Governments’ post-Brexit strategies – this paper provides an overview of how developments under the May administration have largely entrenched the Constitutional status quo. The power of Royal Prerogative and the limitations of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (CRaG) continue to severely constrain the power of the legislature when it comes to the ratification of trade-related treaties. Although this has so far only lead to some muted criticisms from stakeholders and parliamentarians, it is likely to face much fiercer criticism when the UK starts exercising an independent trade policy in earnest.
