Description
The purpose of the paper is to examine how the decision of India to develop sea-based nuclear deterrence is determined by the nuclear strategies of its rival states. It also seeks to study the role of domestic elements and political contestations within the state that underlie the development of India’s nuclear triad and its sea-based nuclear deterrence in the second nuclear age, from the period of 1998 to 2016. With the adoption of the sea-based nuclear deterrence, India aimed to secure its second-strike capacity, which also provides credibility to its nuclear doctrine.
The paper would be divided into four sections. The first part would concentrate on explaining India’s decision to pursue the sea-based deterrence, and how it is less explained by the logic of the Cold War and more to do with role of distrust of the adversaries in the immediate nuclear neighbourhood. The second part would concentrate on the domestic elements which shaped India’s nuclear sea-deterrence capability. The third part analyses why the Indian nuclear doctrine has been modified to accommodate the Indian nuclear triad. Finally, the fourth part examines the modifications that have been made in the maritime doctrine of India from 1998 to 2009 in operational terms.
