Description
A western-led emphasis on robust peacekeeping and civilian protection that is reflected in the mandates of recent United Nations peacekeeping missions is often met with well-documents instances of inaction on part of various troop contributing country (TCC) units in the field. What explains this gap between mandate and performance? Drawing on a combination of archival, secondary and primary data collected with Indian military peacekeepers, this paper explains how the Indian military has interpreted and applied the demands of robustness and civilian protection in its peacekeeping engagements across Africa over time. Drawing on micro case-studies from Katanga, Congo (1962), Sierra Leone (1999-2000), North Kivu (2005-2008), and South Sudan (2014-present), the study advances three prominent explanations. First, self-perception of its rising power in the international system, makes the Indian government less willing to act as a meek and conformist delegate of western peacekeeping mandates. Second, a lack of recognition of early robust efforts often above and beyond mandate requirements has marred Indian enthusiasm for risk over time. Third, economic prosperity and narrowing gaps in pay and benefits at home, make UN peacekeeping assignments in dangerous locations less appealing especially for the younger generation of officers. The overall result is a perceptible shift from fielding troops to becoming a leading provider of peacekeeping training for new peacekeeping troops from Africa and Asia.
